Outlook

[Official] : FW: "The wall"

[redacted]

From: [redacted]
Sent: 09 November 2026 18:15
To: [redacted]
Cc: [redacted]
Subject: "The wall"

HI [redacted]

My jaw dropped when I saw this the email re “the wall”.
I have run it past our archive of the drainage plans, the recent claims re compensatory storage under the suds tanks , Kaya modelling and my critique of the drainage problems.

This change aggravates means of the existing problems and brings new ones, such as "differential settlement pipe-shearing”

Given that the water will be flowing from the Bothlin to the park in a 1/1000 yr + cc event the houses at Larkfield are imperilled by this (even more).

Surely the time has come for someone to realise that **the drainage plans just will not work?**

[redacted]


Careresi Ar
Pitch
Footba



Objection or area of objection	Why it matters, why it is a material consideration and why it is an objection to TP/ED/26/0104 OR why it demonstrates procedural unfairness or predetermination, and renders TP/ED/26/0104 unlawful	Relevant Legislation or Guidance
Hydraulic, structural, and geotechnical invalidation of Kaya's Flood Risk Assessment (PL57) and Curtins' Drainage Strategy (PL127, PL128, PL154, and Causeway Flow model) caused by replacing the southern 'green retaining wall' with a 197.22m deep-piled precast concrete retaining wall (admitted in Document PL153 and Fraser McNair's 9 November 2026 email due to 'high ground settlement risk')	Replacing the vegetated 'green retaining wall' along the 197.22m southern boundary with a deep-piled precast concrete retaining wall (Document PL153, admitted by Case Officer Fraser McNair on 9 November 2026 due to 'high ground settlement risk') invalidates both Kaya's FRA (PL57) and Curtins' Drainage Strategy (PL127, PL128, PL154, and Causeway Flow model) on five counts: (1) Above-ground concrete dam effect: walling off ~65% (~1.65 ha) of the 2.5 ha southern functional floodplain behind a 197.22m x 2.26m precast concrete face (445.7 m²) compresses the 12,246 to 17,015+ m³ of trapped 1:1,000-year + CC floodwater into the remaining ~0.85 ha corridor behind Larkfield Road, raising flood depths from 0.49m–0.68m to 1.44m–2.00m (+0.95m to +1.32m higher); (2) Subterranean groundwater cutoff dam: driving piles and a continuous concrete pile-cap/ground-beam across 197.22m through up to 4.8m of waterlogged peat (946.7 m² subsurface barrier) blocks natural north-to-south shallow groundwater flow (<1.0m depth), driving water levels higher around buried SuDS Tank 2 (51.30m–51.60m AOD) and forcing groundwater up into Larkfield Road rear gardens; (3) Direct refutation of PL154 Item 7: sealing the pitch perimeter with a piled precast concrete wall to retain imported fill ('proposed ground raising') proves Curtins' claim to the EDC Flood Risk Officer in PL154 Item 7 (that compensatory flood storage could be provided 'beneath the pitch... supported by a piled raft slab') is physically impossible; (4) Differential settlement pipe-shearing & unmodelled wall drainage: the southern outfall pipes from Tank 2 (Node S67 at 50.98m AOD and Nodes S25/S26 at 50.80m/50.88m AOD) must penetrate the rigid piled concrete wall into an un-piled ditch with admitted 'high ground settlement risk' (creating severe pipe-shearing risk), while mandatory back-of-wall hydrostatic collector drains and weep holes discharge unmodelled flows directly into Drainage Channel 1; and (5) Contamination mobilisation: driving piles along the 197.22m boundary corridor punches straight through unlined industrial ash (up to 7,700 mg/kg lead, PAHs, and chrysotile asbestos) immediately adjacent to Drainage Channel 1 with zero riparian buffer.	National Planning Framework 4 (NPF4) Policy 22(a) and Policy 22(c) (Flood risk and water management - prohibition on reducing floodplain storage capacity, displacing surface water and groundwater onto Larkfield Road properties, and failing to model subterranean groundwater damming and back-of-wall drainage inflows)
Hydraulic, structural, and geotechnical invalidation of Kaya's Flood Risk Assessment (PL57) and Curtins' Drainage Strategy (PL127, PL128, PL154, and Causeway Flow model) caused by replacing the southern 'green retaining wall' with a 197.22m deep-piled precast concrete retaining wall (admitted in Document PL153 and Fraser McNair's 9 November 2026 email due to 'high ground settlement risk')	Replacing the vegetated 'green retaining wall' along the 197.22m southern boundary with a deep-piled precast concrete retaining wall (Document PL153, admitted by Case Officer Fraser McNair on 9 November 2026 due to 'high ground settlement risk') invalidates both Kaya's FRA (PL57) and Curtins' Drainage Strategy (PL127, PL128, PL154, and Causeway Flow model) on five counts: (1) Above-ground concrete dam effect: walling off ~65% (~1.65 ha) of the 2.5 ha southern functional floodplain behind a 197.22m x 2.26m precast concrete face (445.7 m²) compresses the 12,246 to 17,015+ m³ of trapped 1:1,000-year + CC floodwater into the remaining ~0.85 ha corridor behind Larkfield Road, raising flood depths from 0.49m–0.68m to 1.44m–2.00m (+0.95m to +1.32m higher); (2) Subterranean groundwater cutoff dam: driving piles and a continuous concrete pile-cap/ground-beam across 197.22m through up to 4.8m of waterlogged peat (946.7 m² subsurface barrier) blocks natural north-to-south shallow groundwater flow (<1.0m depth), driving water levels higher around buried SuDS Tank 2 (51.30m–51.60m AOD) and forcing groundwater up into Larkfield Road rear gardens; (3) Direct refutation of PL154 Item 7: sealing the pitch perimeter with a piled precast concrete wall to retain imported fill ('proposed ground raising') proves Curtins' claim to the EDC Flood Risk Officer in PL154 Item 7 (that compensatory flood storage could be provided 'beneath the pitch... supported by a piled raft slab') is physically impossible; (4) Differential settlement pipe-shearing & unmodelled wall drainage: the southern outfall pipes from Tank 2 (Node S67 at 50.98m AOD and Nodes S25/S26 at 50.80m/50.88m AOD) must penetrate the rigid piled concrete wall into an un-piled ditch with admitted 'high ground settlement risk' (creating severe pipe-shearing risk), while mandatory back-of-wall hydrostatic collector drains and weep holes discharge unmodelled flows directly into Drainage Channel 1; and (5) Contamination mobilisation: driving piles along the 197.22m boundary corridor punches straight through unlined industrial ash (up to 7,700 mg/kg lead, PAHs, and chrysotile asbestos) immediately adjacent to Drainage Channel 1 with zero riparian buffer.	R (Mansell) v Tonbridge and Malling BC [2017] EWCA Civ 1314, Secretary of State for Education and Science v Tameside MBC [1977] AC 1014, and Gillespie v First Secretary of State [2003] EWCA Civ 400 (Material misdirection of the EDC Flood Risk Officer in PL154 Item 7 regarding 'scope for flood compensation beneath the pitch' when PL153 walls off the pitch perimeter with piled precast concrete and earthfill, and failure to assess differential settlement shearing at outfall Nodes S25/S26/S67)
Hydraulic, structural, and geotechnical invalidation of Kaya's Flood Risk Assessment (PL57) and Curtins' Drainage Strategy (PL127, PL128, PL154, and Causeway Flow model) caused by replacing the southern 'green retaining wall' with a 197.22m deep-piled precast concrete retaining wall (admitted in Document PL153 and Fraser McNair's 9 November 2026 email due to 'high ground settlement risk')	Replacing the vegetated 'green retaining wall' along the 197.22m southern boundary with a deep-piled precast concrete retaining wall (Document PL153, admitted by Case Officer Fraser McNair on 9 November 2026 due to 'high ground settlement risk') invalidates both Kaya's FRA (PL57) and Curtins' Drainage Strategy (PL127, PL128, PL154, and Causeway Flow model) on five counts: (1) Above-ground concrete dam effect: walling off ~65% (~1.65 ha) of the 2.5 ha southern functional floodplain behind a 197.22m x 2.26m precast concrete face (445.7 m²) compresses the 12,246 to 17,015+ m³ of trapped 1:1,000-year + CC floodwater into the remaining ~0.85 ha corridor behind Larkfield Road, raising flood depths from 0.49m–0.68m to 1.44m–2.00m (+0.95m to +1.32m higher); (2) Subterranean groundwater cutoff dam: driving piles and a continuous concrete pile-cap/ground-beam across 197.22m through up to 4.8m of waterlogged peat (946.7 m² subsurface barrier) blocks natural north-to-south shallow groundwater flow (<1.0m depth), driving water levels higher around buried SuDS Tank 2 (51.30m–51.60m AOD) and forcing groundwater up into Larkfield Road rear gardens; (3) Direct refutation of PL154 Item 7: sealing the pitch perimeter with a piled precast concrete wall to retain imported fill ('proposed ground raising') proves Curtins' claim to the EDC Flood Risk Officer in PL154 Item 7 (that compensatory flood storage could be provided 'beneath the pitch... supported by a piled raft slab') is physically impossible; (4) Differential settlement pipe-shearing & unmodelled wall drainage: the southern outfall pipes from Tank 2 (Node S67 at 50.98m AOD and Nodes S25/S26 at 50.80m/50.88m AOD) must penetrate the rigid piled concrete wall into an un-piled ditch with admitted 'high ground settlement risk' (creating severe pipe-shearing risk), while mandatory back-of-wall hydrostatic collector drains and weep holes discharge unmodelled flows directly into Drainage Channel 1; and (5) Contamination mobilisation: driving piles along the 197.22m boundary corridor punches straight through unlined industrial ash (up to 7,700 mg/kg lead, PAHs, and chrysotile asbestos) immediately adjacent to Drainage Channel 1 with zero riparian buffer.	Building (Scotland) Regulations 2004 (Schedule 5, Mandatory Standard 3.6 Surface water drainage and Standard 1.1 Structure) and CIRIA C753 (The SuDS Manual - structural integrity of drainage outfalls crossing a rigid piled retaining wall into high-settlement peat, and unmodelled hydrostatic relief drainage behind a 197.22m retaining wall)
Hydraulic, structural, and geotechnical invalidation of Kaya's Flood Risk	Replacing the vegetated 'green retaining wall' along the 197.22m southern boundary with a deep-piled precast concrete retaining wall (Document PL153, admitted by Case Officer Fraser McNair on 9 November 2026 due to 'high ground settlement risk') invalidates both Kaya's FRA (PL57) and Curtins' Drainage	Water Environment (Controlled Activities) (Scotland) Regulations 2011 (CAR), Environmental

Assessment (PL57) and Curtins' Drainage Strategy (PL127, PL128, PL154, and Causeway Flow model) caused by replacing the southern 'green retaining wall' with a 197.22m deep-piled precast concrete retaining wall (admitted in Document PL153 and Fraser McNair's 9 November 2026 email due to 'high ground settlement risk')	Strategy (PL127, PL128, PL154, and Causeway Flow model) on five counts: (1) Above-ground concrete dam effect: walling off ~65% (~1.65 ha) of the 2.5 ha southern functional floodplain behind a 197.22m x 2.26m precast concrete face (445.7 m²) compresses the 12,246 to 17,015+ m³ of trapped 1:1,000-year + CC floodwater into the remaining ~0.85 ha corridor behind Larkfield Road, raising flood depths from 0.49m–0.68m to 1.44m–2.00m (+0.95m to +1.32m higher); (2) Subterranean groundwater cutoff dam: driving piles and a continuous concrete pile-cap/ground-beam across 197.22m through up to 4.8m of waterlogged peat (946.7 m² subsurface barrier) blocks natural north-to-south shallow groundwater flow (<1.0m depth), driving water levels higher around buried SuDS Tank 2 (51.30m–51.60m AOD) and forcing groundwater up into Larkfield Road rear gardens; (3) Direct refutation of PL154 Item 7: sealing the pitch perimeter with a piled precast concrete wall to retain imported fill ('proposed ground raising') proves Curtins' claim to the EDC Flood Risk Officer in PL154 Item 7 (that compensatory flood storage could be provided 'beneath the pitch... supported by a piled raft slab') is physically impossible; (4) Differential settlement pipe-shearing & unmodelled wall drainage: the southern outfall pipes from Tank 2 (Node S67 at 50.98m AOD and Nodes S25/S26 at 50.80m/50.88m AOD) must penetrate the rigid piled concrete wall into an un-piled ditch with admitted 'high ground settlement risk' (creating severe pipe-shearing risk), while mandatory back-of-wall hydrostatic collector drains and weep holes discharge unmodelled flows directly into Drainage Channel 1; and (5) Contamination mobilisation: driving piles along the 197.22m boundary corridor punches straight through unlined industrial ash (up to 7,700 mg/kg lead, PAHs, and chrysotile asbestos) immediately adjacent to Drainage Channel 1 with zero riparian buffer.	Protection Act 1990 (Part IIA), and R (Champion) v North Norfolk District Council [2015] UKSC 52 (Unassessed vertical and lateral pollution pathways created by driving deep foundation piles for a 197.22m concrete wall through 1,400–7,700 mg/kg lead ash and deep peat alongside Drainage Channel 1 without a 6m–10m riparian buffer)